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Chapter I
Statement of the Problem
The general purpose of thi3 study was to explore some aspects of
social cognition in young children. More specifically, the research
was designed to examine the sensitivity of preschool children to
imbalance in small scale social systems.
Background and Theory .
Social cognition . Over the past twenty years, the area of social
cognition, sometimes referred to as social judgment, social perception or
person perception, has steadily grown in importance. Beginning with the
early work of Asch (194-6) concerning the organizational characteristics
of social judgments, and going up to the recent work of Heider (1967)
studying social judgments of artificial social objects (geometric forms),
two decades of empirical investigation supply evidence of how people per-
ceive and make social judgments of others. Much of this research is
characterized by drastically different methodologies. Asch (194-6) read
lists of traits belonging to a person to a group of subjects who were to
form impressions and write a brief account of this particular person.
Gollin (1954) used a motion picture with a single actor behaving in var-
ious ways, and then asked his subjects to write impressions. Instead of
using people as stimulus objects, Keider has, for some years, worked with
artificial social objects (Keider and Simmel, 1944; Keider, 1967). Kis
geometric figures are presented to S
g
via a moving film sequence. Most
S see the figures as animated beings and their movements interpreted in
—
s
terms of human attributes.
2Despite the different methodologies, each line of investigation indi-
cates that the impressions one forms are dependent upon organizing pro-
cesses. In this organization it is easy to see that "good" things go
together and "bad" things go together. Thus, a general evaluative 3et
is known to influence the organization of social stimuli. However, the
major development in this area has been general theories of cognitive
organization that revolve around the premise that humans have a need for
cognitive consistency. These theories include the congruity model, dis-
sonance theory and the balance model. Although these three basic notions
differ among themselves on several points, all agree that it is the
tension produced by inconsistency that instigates change and that this
change is in the direction of restoring the cognitive system to a state
of consistency.
The congruity model, developed, by Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955), has
been applied to the study of attitudes and predictions of attitude change.
Briefly, the model deals with objects of attitudes and the bonds which
link them. One has attitudes about people, ideas, etc., which are the
objects of the attitudes. The objects can be quantified on a continuum
of +3 to -3 and the bonds can be of two types: associative and dissoci-
ative bonds (expressions of disapproval) link objects that have the same
numbers but opposite signs. For example, an NAACP official (+3) attacking
the position (dissociative bond) of the Ku Klux Klan (-3). There is
consistency when associative bonds are created between objects at the same
value positions (with like sign). All other states are incongrous, hence
they will create tension arid initiate some change in the immediate psycho-
social environment. A more complete statement of the congruity model can
3bo found in Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957).
The theory of cognitive dissonar. ;e (Festinger, 1957) is much like
the congruity model discussed above, dissonance is the term for di
equilibrium and consonance has the same meaning as equilibrium or bala.
in the prior model. Dissonance theory states that two elemc.-. ^ro lid-
sonant if one implies the negation of the other, i.e., if A implies not B.
If A implies B then the two cognitive elements are consonant and there
will be no tension or discomfort in the cognitive system. The interested
reader is referred to Brehm and Cohen (1962) for a review of the many
studies conducted within the framework of dissonance theory.
Balance theory (Heider, 1953) also stresses cognitive equalibrium.
Heider pointed out that causal expectations must be congrous with respect
to related objects in order for cognitive stability to exist. "For a
state of complete cognitive harmony to exist, the various implications of
a person's expectations or judgments of any one aspect of the cognized
environment may not contradict the implications of his expectation or
judgment in respect to any other aspect of the cognized environment
(Deutsch and Xrauss, 1965, p. 33)." Heider' s formulation of balance deals
with affective liking and disliking ("L" and "DL" ) and also unit-forming
and unit-segregating relations ("U" and "not U"). Unit-forming relations
include causality and ownership while unit-segregating relations include
'
the opposite. For balance to exist, a positive unit relation calls for
a positive sentiment (affect) relation (L implies U). Of course, the
opposite is also an instance of balance: a negative sentiment relation
calls for a negative unit relation (DL implies not U). This model is
equally appropriate to social situations as it is to attitudes toward
objects. Considering three socially interrelated persons; an instance of
balance could be one in which "A" likes "B" but dislikes "C," "B" also
dislikes "C" but likes "A." In this example, all three parties are In a
state of cognitive balance (assuming that "C" dislikes both "A" and "B").
An illustration of imbalance could be a situation in vhich "A rt likes both
"B" and "C" but "3" and "C" dislike each other. Thus "A" is left in a
state of imbalance and will move toward producing a change in his per-
ceptual-cognitive field. Balance could be achieved in several ways. "A"
might decide that he really doesn't like "B" (or "C"), or "A" could dis-
tort reality and see "B" and "C" liking each other. Although there are
several ways an imbalanced situation can be made consistent, balance
theory contends that, "In general, the nature of the cognitive changes
resulting from an imbalance will tend to produce the most congruence and
the least changes in the perceptual-cognitive field (Deutsch and Krauss,
1965, p. 33)."
Thus the three major models are similar in that they "... assert
that a person attempts to perceive, cognize, or evaluate the various
aspects of his environment and of himself in such a way that the behavi-
oral implications of his perceptions shall not be contradictory (Deutsch
and Krauss, 1965 p. 68)." The basic concept of what we shall call
(following neider) cognitive balance is the structural beam of all con-
sistency models.
Developmental approaches . A great deal of empirical research using
adults as S
g
has been conducted in the area of cognitive balance. The
aims of the present study do not require a detailed review of this
research. Although there has as yet been comparatively little develop-
mental research done in this area it is crucial to examine how social
5cognition develops in children. The issue is important in at least two
ways. First, to extend theoretical knowledge not only in the area of
social cognition but the general area of child development as well.
Second, the issue can have important practical implications for parents,
educators and those working in the area of mental health.
Because the chief element in the existing theories is imbalance, the
present study is based on the assumption that developmental research should
be conducted to determine whether children are sensitive to or aware of
imbalance. Theoretically oriented research concerning the broader problem
of social cognition in children is still quite new. However, a brief
review will indicate the context within which the present study must be
understood.
Gollin (1953) had adolescents write judgments of a boy depicted in a
five-scene silent movie. The observer's statements reflected both fairly
accurate perceptions of and inferences about the boy's behavior. Gollin
did find, however, that the stimulus qualities of the person being judged
were sometimes modified.
Yarrow and Campbell (1963) employed an interview methodology to study
person perception in children aged 8 through 13. The children put empha-
sis on interaction and the use of evaluative appraisals. It was also
found that older children tended to give more complex perceptual reports.
Vhiteman (1967) studied children's conceptions of psychological
causality in 5-9 year olds. Story situations involving the motivations
of a child were told to the children, yhiteman found that the younger
children related the story in overt behavioral terms while the older chil-
dren centered on more covert intent when relating the child's behavior.
6Fritzler (1967), following the work of Holder (Heider and Simmel,
1944; Heider, 1967) required different aged childron (age 6-12) to respond
to a set of four standard cartoons (artificial social objects) showing
quantity changes in a study of person perception. Fritzler found evidence
of developmental levels in person perception. Younger children tended to
give more statements of affect and very few statements of intention when
asked to tell a story about the cartoons. The older children depended
less on the perceptual qualities of the artificial social objects and more
on the structural relationships of intention.
In a review of the literature on social perception in children, Dubin
and Dubin (1965) concluded that social perception is age related, that
older children perceive with more objectivity the characteristics of
persons. They also contend that new techniques are needed to measure
social perception in young children where reading and writing skills are
limited.
In brief, the research reviewed above would indicate that children
are able to make judgments concerning social perceptions. Furthermore,
most of the research also shows a developmental pattern to social cogni-
tion: younger children are less complex, are more concerned with physical
appearances and give fewer inference statements, while older children
respond in a more adult fashion.
Viewed from the standpoint of general cognitive theory, the contri-
bution of the earlier research is to clear the way for more analytical
studies based on a more rigorous theory of social cognition. Since
balance theory concerns a fundamental cognitive premise i.e., that people
strive to maintain cognitive consistency, a rigorous investigation of the
7balance principle in the social cognition of children now seems appropri-
ate. The present research is thus especially designed is thus especially
designed to probe the issue of imbalance because this issue is critical
for existing theories of adult social cognition. However, as Dubin and
Dubin (1965) suggest, effective research in this area depends upon proper
methodology. The following section describes preliminary studies leading
to the development of a new method for working with children.
Pilot Research
.
Theoretical feasibility . In order to carry out an investigation of
sensitivity to imbalance in young children it was first of all necessary
to find appropriate means to present children with meaningful social re-
lationships containing imbalance. In this connection, preliminary studies
were carried out with young children given stories concerning two hypo-
thetical characters. It was soon found that even preschool children could
indeed understand stories involving imbalance between hypothetical
characters, and between such characters and himself. Thus, for example,
in preliminary stories characters were described to children in which they
were able to state preferences and simple solutions to hypothetical
problems involving these characters.
Technical feasibility
. While it was being established that appropri-
ate material could be understood by young children it also became apparent
that the method of presentation could be standardized. Tape recordings of
the stories were made for purposes of convenience and standardization.
As the work proceeded it became clear that the children not only
enjoyed the stories, but that they were also quite fascinated with the
tape recorder itself. They would examine it thoroughly outside and then
8want to look inside to neo the people who wore talking. Many timeri, they
would talk back to the character voicos. Since the children obviously
enjoyed talking to the characters, the stimulus material was modified to
promote an actual interaction not only betveen the characters but also
between them and the child. At this point, a second recorder was added
to preserve children's responses. In sum, the preliminary work showed
that a 2-recorder system could be employed to both present stimulus
material and maintain a record of responses.
Content . The technical problems being solved there still remained
the question of content. What sort of social material can be employed to
generate a meaningful imbalance for a child? The pilot data revealed that
children were making most of their responses of preference and simple
solutions in terms of affect toward the characters: "I would rather play
with 'Captain Billy' because I like him and he likes me." Children also
made responses in the course of pilot testing that suggested a concern
with "power. " Some of the characters were perceived as being of different
sizes, and stronger or weaker than the other. In order to further investi-
gate this finding and bring it under experimental control, several small
toys were shown to children and described as belonging to one of the
characters. The character owning the toys controlled their use; hence he
was, operationally, a more powerful figure. The classical definition of
power given by Cartwright and Zander (I960) is the maximum force which A
can induce on B minus the maximum resisting force which 3 counter exerts.
However, in the context of the present research, power is operationally
defined as "the possession of desirable attributes or objects.
"
9In sum, it was decided, on the ba3is of tho pilot research, to
manipulate both affect and power in order to create imbalance. The final
stimulus tapes, therefore, were constructed to convey the imbalance de-
scribed by Heider in ways that pilot work indicated would be meaningful
to young children.
Specific Aims .
The research was finally designed as an exploratory study centering
on two specific issues or questions. First, can preschool children (4.-5)
be employed as S
g
in a rigorous experimental study of sensitivity to
imbalance? The answer to this question not only depends upon their
abilit3r to understand the stimulus material but also involves the develop-
ment of procedures and methods that can be used to analyze apparently
arbitrary responses.
Secondly, the research concerns the basis on which children respond.
If they do indicate sensitivity to imbalance, what factors can be seen as
explaining their sensitivity?
Chapter II
Method and Design
The general purpose of this study, to examine the sensitivity of
young children to imbalance in small scale social systems, was accomplished
by means of a novel social judgment task that was administered to preschool
children.
Stimulus Material.
The stimulus material consisted of taped stories which construct social
relationships between two cartoon character voices and the child S. Three
stories were used. All of them involved establishment of affective relation-
ships. That is, the characters either liked or disliked each other, and/or
the child S. In essence, all stories followed the same sequence: (l) the
first character ("A") introduces himself and establishes an affective re-
lationship between himself and the child; (2) character E comes on, intro-
duces himself and inquires about the relationship between "A" and the child;
(3) character A and 3, talking to each other and to the child, structure
the affective relationships between themselves; (4.) character A establishes
himself as being more powerful than "B" by informing the child that he will
allow the child to play with his toys (which were visible to the child) if
character B will leave; (5) character B refuses to leave. (See Appendix A
for a complete transcript of the stories. ) In summary, the purpose of the
tapes is to construct a situation in which the child can be faced with a
cognitive dilemma concerning the affective and power relationships between
himself and two others.
For theoretical purposes, each of the three story situations is pre-
sented schematically in Figure 1. In situation #1 both characters have a
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(Power) - (Power) - (Power) +
A\ /B
^^^^^
Child
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Fig. 1. Schematic drawings of the story situations.
The sides of the trianales denote the bonds
between each of the cognitive elements (re: Heider,
1958) and the plus and minus signs denote the affect
toward each of the elements. It is assumed that the
affect applies in either direction along the sides of
the triangles.
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positive affective bond with the child while sharing a negative affective
bond between themselves. Situation #2 shows character A with negative
affective bonds with the child and with character 3. There exists a posi-
tive bond between character E and the child. Situation f/3 depicts
character E with positive affective bonds to both character A and the
child. Character A and the child are linked with a negative bond.
It should be clear that these 3 story situations constitute the major
manipulation (independent variable) in the study. As will be made clear
below, depending upon how children responded to the stories (dependent
variable), it could be determined whether or not they were sensitive to
imbalance
.
Task and Procedure .
Six male and seven female nursery-school children (age range 3 yr.
7 mo. - 5 yr. 2 mo; X = L, yr. 5 mo.) were used as S . All children were
from middle-class families but of varied racial background. Each S was
tested individually with the instructions that he would meet some people
who live in the box (tape recorder) , that they would probably talk to him
and that he could talk back to them. After presenting the stimulus tape,
1, briefly reconstructed the story situation and asked S to solve the
dilemma between himself and the characters. This dilemma is based on the
fact that the child cannot play with the toys unless one character leaves,
but this character refuses to leave. The S was asked what the two
characters should do about the dilemma. If this didn't elicit a response,
S was asked what he would do.
The subject was then asked to indicate which of two paper cut-out
figures (identical except for size) was character A and which was
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Character B. Following this, S was asked (l) which do you like best?
V.hy? (2) Which would you rather play with next time? Why? (3) How do
"A" and "B" feel about each other? Why do you think this is so? In
brief, the procedure involved: (A) General instructions: (E) Taped
story: (C) S reports solution of dilemma: (D) S 1 indications of
character preferences.
Design
.
Since the stimulus tapes are of short duration (approximately 3
minutes) all three tapes were 'presented to each S in one experimental
session. Order effects were controlled for by counter-balancing order of
presentation across Sg . This repeated-measures design allows the exami-
nation of solutions to each social situation over each S thus affording
a check on consistency of solution for each individual S.
Hypothe se s .
As stated earlier Heider's theory of cognitive balance predicts that
adults perceive and resolve conflict in imbalanced social situations.
Since no previous research testing this notion with young children has
been carried out, the major hypothesis of the present work is that pre-
school children also have this cognitive ability.
It was predicted that if children are sensitive to imbalance:
(1) their responses would be of the nature to bring about consistency
in the imbalanced situations.
(2) their responses would tend to produce the least change in the
perceptual-cognitive field.
Chapter III
Results
The separate analyses presented in this section are designed to
examine several different questions relevant to the global question of
whether or not young children are sensitive to imbalance. These analyses
concern: (l) Identification of cut-out figures, (2) Balancing responses,
(3) Non-balancing responses, (A) Preference responses, and (5) Dilemma
responses.
Identification of Gut-out s.
Immediately after S
g
heard the stimulus tapes, they were shown two
paper cut-outs, exactly the same (except for size), and told that the
cut-outs were the characters from the story situation. The S were asked
s
to indicate which cut-out corresponded to each character. In 37 of the
39 cases, S identified the larger cut-out as the character that was
*
-s
operationally defined as more powerful, by virtue of his possession of
the toys. Since it was expected that the children would associate power
with size, this result tends to confirm our operational definition of
power.
Balancing Responses .
If children are sensitive, it was expected that they would suggest
some action that would bring about a balanced state. To examine this
proposition, S ' responses were shown to three independent judges who
categorized them as to whether or not they were balancing responses.
Any response that could be interpreted as changing valences of the con-
necting bonds resulting in a balanced condition was acceptable. Consider
15
for example, S 1 responses for situation ffe: ">'ake Captain Frankie leave.
I like Captain Charlie and want to play with him. Captain Frankie and
Captain Charlie are not friends." The judges categorized this situation
as being balanced because S liked one character and together, they dis-
liked the second character. Another example judged to be balanced comes
from S' responses to situation #1: "I like both Captain Billy and
Captain Jimmy. They are good friends and like me." This situation is
balanced because there exists positive affective bonds between all three
parties involved. The average intercorrelation between the three judges'
categorizing responses was .90 (d.f. = 33, p < .001), indicating a high
degree of inter-judge reliability. The results of the balancing responses
analysis are shown in Table 1. Twenty-eight of 39 instances were judged
as balanced (binomial probability < .01), demonstrating that children
respond to the stimulus situations in such a manner as to bring about con-
sistency in their immediate perceptual-cognitive environment.
The second prediction concerned the manner in which children would
impose consistency on the imbalanced stimulus situations. According to
balance theory, S
g
attempt to achieve balance in ways which least change
the perceptual-cognitive field. In this connection, S 1 responses to the
two imbalanced stimulus situations (ffl and #3) were examined. Of the 20
instances of balancing responses for these two situations, 18 involved
changing the valence of only one affective bond.
Nor.-balancing Responses .
Further analysis of the balance data was made in order to examine the
II cases in which S
g
did not balance the stimulus situations. Note that
the results given in Table 1 include S 1 responses to all three of the
16
TABLE 1
Analysis of balancing versus non-balancing
responses over all three stimulus situations.
Stimulus 1 Stimulus 2 Stimulus 3 Totals
Ealancing
Responses
10 8 10 23
Non-
Balancing
Responses
3 5 3 11
N = 39 Binomial probability < .01
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stimulus situations. However, it will be remembered that situation //2
was balanced with respect to affect. Of the 11 non-balancing responses,
5 were given for situation ff2. Thus the largest number of non-balancing
responses were made to the already balanced stimulus situation. The re-
maining 6 cases of non-balancing responses were distributed equally over
the other two stimulus situations. The 3 cases of non-balancing responses
for situation §\ were due to S
g
who apparently ignored, or were never
aware of the imbalance in the story. The 3 non-balancing responses for
situation //3 were random and involved changing the valence of more than
one affective bond. (A. schematic presentation of all S 1 responses is
shown in Appendix 3).
Preference Responses
.
Because S 1 decisions as to which character he preferred to play with
and/or like, clearly influence all his responses, these decisions were
examined in detail. Table 2 compares the preference responses (like and
play) for the more powerful and the less powerful character. The analysis
over all three story situations demonstrates that young children signifi-
cantly preferred the more powerful character (binomial probability < .02).
The majority of the balancing responses were in line with this finding,
viz. , the less powerful character was rejected by S and was perceived as
not being liked by the more powerful character.
However, this result does not take into account the specific relation-
ship between power and affect in each stimulus situation. That is, the
general power preference indicated in Table 2 is inflated by the fact that
in situation ffl the more powerful character also shows positive affect.
Further analysis was therefore done on situations #1 and #3 in which power
TABLE 2
Children's preferences for either more powerful
character or less powerful character over all
three stimulus situations.
Like Play Like/Play
Power 26 2U 50
No
Power 13 15 23
N = 78 Binomial probability <. .02
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is pitted directly against affect: i.e., the more powerful character
shares a negative affective bond with S, and the less powerful character
shares a positive affective bond with S. From the total of 52 preference
responses, 31 were given for the more powerful character. The analysis in
Table 3 shows no significant preference for either power or affect when
they are thus placed in direct opposition.
Dilemma Responses
.
In addition to the analyses directed toward the hypotheses stated
earlier, S ' solutions to the choice dilemma (the question concerning what
the characters should do) were also examined. The solutions were put into
one of three categories: (a) rejection, (b) sharing, and (c) no-solution.
An example of a solution falling into the rejection category was: "Let's
talk Captain Jan into leaving." Other instances of rejection concerned
the two characters fighting, with the preferred character emerging the
victor. "Make Captain Billy let us all play with the toys, because we're
all friends" is a typical solution that fell into the sharing category.
When S did not answer, or made a non-solving response, this was put into
the no-solution category. There were 26 instances of rejection (most
involving the less powerful character), 8 cases of sharing, and 5 cases
of no-solution.
Together, the above data indicates that preschool age children under-
stood the stories and the built-in dilemma. The data further indicates
that they were sensitive to the imbalance in the stimulus situations and
were able to change them in order to bring about consistency.
TABLE 3
Children's preference responses
when power is in direct opposition
with affect (situations #2 & #3).
Like Play Like/Play Comb.
Power
Neg. Aff. 17 H 31
No
Power
Pos. Aff. 9 12 21
N = 52 Binonial probability N. S.
Chapter IV
Discussion and Summary
General Findings .
The general findings of this study support the notion that young
children respond to imbalance in a manner much like adults. Moreover,
the results of the present study are in line with the general findings of
developmental studies conducted within the last ten years. Eecause of new
and better techniques for working with children, these studies have shown
that young children have greater abilities than had been previously
thought. In the area of perception, for example, Bower (1967) utilized
the sucking response in an operant conditioning procedure to demonstrate
a high degree of perceptual organization in infants just 36 days of age.
In programatic studies by Koore (1964), it has been shown that young
children can acquire reading and writing skills even as early as age 3 1/2
or 4.. The present research, also employing a new methodology, shows that
in the area of social cognition, young children's abilities also go beyond
expectations.
Specific Findings .
Sensitivity to imbalance . The results concerning children's sensi-
tivity to imbalance, per se, must be qualified by the fact that the
children were not only presented with imbalanced stimulus situations, but
they were also made aware of the imbalance when confronted with the dilemma
questions. Their responses to this "forced" imbalance were very real,
however, and followed the pattern that balance theory suggests. This does
not imply that the children were not, in fact, able to perceive the
imbalance in the stimulus stories by themselves. But it is not possible
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to answer this question in the present study. The dilemma question pro-
cedure was used here in order to compensate for any arbitrary distortion
due to the children's limited memory span. The need for future research
in cognitive development using less directive procedures to convey
theoretical imbalance is indicated.
Non-balancing responses . As was shown in the results section, most
of the non-balancing responses were given for stimulus situation //2 which
was, at the outset, theoretically balanced. The typical non-balancing
response for this situation followed from the child ignoring the immediate
dilemma. For example , one child simply responded to the dilemma question
as follows: "I like Captain Jan because he likes me. But I also like
Captain Max because he has toys. They are not friends." Thus in the
course of responding in terms of his preferences, S constructed a theoret-
ically imbalanced state because he likes the two characters who dislike
each other. The data here, although not substantial, indicate that power
(possession of toys) has the effect of changing a negative affective bond
into a positive affective bond. Because this is such an intrinsically
interesting point, further study was done by examining every instance in
which the initial affective bond between the powerful character and the
child was negative. In the 26 such cases, Sg changed the negative bond
to a positive bond 19 times. Chi square analysis (x = 5.52, d.f. = 1,
p < .02) indicates that these data are not due to chance responding. If
power does have this effect then these data bear directly on the prefer-
ence responses.
Preference responses . Vhile the major purpose of the present study
concerned balancing responses, children's preferences were examined in
detail because much of the technical literature as well as everyday
experience, indicates that the general behavior of young children is
heavily influenced by their immediate, emotional likes and dislikes.
When the preference responses over all situations were analyzed, a
significant preference for the more powerful character wa3 found. How-
ever, since the effects of power and the effects of affect were combined
in this analysis no meaningful statement could be made concerning the
true preferences of the children. Therefore, a second analysis wa3 made
in which power and affect were in direct opposition. The results of this
analysis indicated that power and affect were equally preferred.
Results here lead to an especially interesting theoretical issue;
namely, the degree to which power and affect are highly interrelated in
the everyday lives of most young children. The preschool child typically
knows few power figures and in most cases they are his parents, who share
positive affective bonds with him. Separating the two variables appears
to be impossible until the child is confronted with power figures with
whom he shares no affective bonds. Developmental studies determining the
relationship between power and affect are required.
The implications of this issue seem very clear for pedagogy and
psychopathology. Children identify with power figures and prefer to like
them (Johnson, 1963; Kussen and Distler, 1959; Mussen and Rutherford, 1963).
Since power and affect seem to be inextricably tied variables for young
children, the absence of one of these variables could have a deleterious
effect. Take, for example, the classroom situation for a black child.
He would want to identify with and have positive feelings toward the
teacher (power figure). The possibility exists that he would experience
2U
emotional rejection by the power figure and thus be faced with a condition
of neurotic conflict, that is; (a) novel, because power and affect have
been positively correlated .in his past, (b) threatening , because power,
unmitigated by positive affect must provoke anxiety, and (c) antithetical
to learning
,
because energy that might otherwise be available for con-
structive behavior will have to be used for defensive behavior. This
theoretical issue again points out the urgency for developmental research
in this area.
In sum, this research, with the qualifications noted above, indicates
that the area of social cognition in young children be examined with
meaningful results. The value of the present exploratory study seems to
lie in three areas:
(1) The new methodological techniques employed.
(2) The findings of children's sensitivity to. imbalance.
(3) The heuristic value stemming from the issue of power
versus affect in children's preference responses.
APPENDIX A
TAPE 111
Experimenter introductory remarks:
Today we're going to play a fun game and meet some people who live in
this box (pointing to the tape recorder). They will probably talk to you-
you can talk back to them.
Billy : Hello, my name is Captain Billy. What is your name?
That's a nice name, how old are you? Do you go to school?
Well, look who's coming—it's Captain Jimmy.
Jimmy : Kello, my name is Captain Jimmy. What is your name?
What have you two been doing? (Pause for child's response)
Billy : We've been talking because we are friends. I like my new friend
and my friend likes me.
Jimmy : But your friend is my friend too—and we like each other just
as much.
Billy : Well.1 J Captain Jimmy, I don't like you at all.
Jimmy : That's alright 'cause I don't like you either, Captain Billy.
Billy : My friend and I are going to play with my toys
you don't get to play Captain Jimmy. You just better leave
or I won't bring out my toys.
Jimmy ; I'm not going to leave, I'm going to stay here with my friend.
Billy ; Listen Captain Jimmy, if you don't leave us alone I'm not
going to bring out my toys.
E appeals to child to come up with a solution to break the
deadlock between the characters.
Standard questions:
Which do you like best? Why?
Which would you rather play with next time? Why?
How does Capt. Billy and Capt. Jimmy feel about each other?
Why do you think that?
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TAPE //2
Experimenter introductory remarks:
Today we're going to play a fun game and meet some people who live in
this box (pointing to the tape recorder). They will probably talk to you
—
you can talk back to them.
Max : Hello Kid, my name is Captain Kax. What's your name?
Do you go to school?
Well, look who's coming—if it ain't ole Captain Jan.
Jan: Hi.' My name is Captain Jan. What is your name?
That's a nice name. Kow old are you? What have you two
been doing? (Pause for child's response).
Max : We ain't been doin' nothing 'cause we're not friends
—
just talking.
Jan : Well, I think we can be friends~do you think we can be friends?
(E asks child if he thinks Capt. Jan and he can be friends).
Max : You two can be friends if you want to 'cause I don't like either
one of you.
Jan : That's alright because I don't like you either, Captain Max.
Max : Hey Kid, if Captain Jan leaves us alone I'll let you play with my toys.
Jan : I'm not leaving. I'm going to stay here with my friend.
Max : Listen Captain Jan, if you don't leave us alone I'm not going
to bring out my toys. (Pause for response).
E talks to child: "Captain Max wants you and he to play with his
toy». But he won't bring his toys out unless Captain Jan leaves.
And Captain Jan doesn't want to leave because he likes you."
What do you think they should do?
What do you think you should do?
Standard questions:
Which do you like best? Why?
Which would you rather play with next time? Why?
Kow does Capt. Max and Capt. Jan feel about each other?
Why do you think that?
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Experimenter introductory remarks:
Today we're going to play a fun game and meet 3ome people who live
in this box (pointing to the tape recorder). They will probably
talk to you
—
you can talk back to them.
.Charlie : Kello, my name is Captain Charlie. What's your name?
Kow old are you? Do you go to school?
Key, here comes my friend, Captain Frankie.
Frankie : Hi there, my name is Captain Frankie. What is your name?
That's a nice name. Do you have any pets? (Pause)
Would you like to be my friend? I like you.
Charlie ; But Captain Frankie, you are my_ friend. You can't be friends
with both of us because I don't like anybody but you.
Frankie ; Yes Captain Charlie, you and I are friends, but I also like
my new friend even if you don't.
Charlie : I'll let your friend play with my toys if you will leave
us alone Captain Frankie.
Frankie: I don't want to leave my new friend.'
Charlie : If you don't leave us alone Captain Frankie, I won't bring
my toys out.
E talks to child: "Captain Charlie will let you play with his
toys if Captain Frankie leaves. But Captain Frankie doesn't
want to go away because he likes both of you.
What do you think they should do?
What do you think you should do?
Standard questions:
Which do ycu like best? Why?
Which would you rather play with next time? Why?
How does Capt. Charlie and Capt. Frankie feel about each other?
Why do you think that?
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Utilizing a new methodological technique developed for the study of
social cognition in young children, this study represents an extension of
the research in person perception and balance theory. Following Heider,
it was predicted that if children were sensitive to imbalance, they would
respond to imbalance in small scale social systems in a manner much like
adults. Furthermore, their responses would be such that only minimal
changes would be imposed on their perceptual-cognitive field.
Thirteen nursery-school children were tested individually on three
recorded stories concerning the hypothetical state of balance involving
two cartoon-like character voices and the child. The story situations
were designed to create a dilemma for the child. After hearing each of
the story situations, the subject was asked; (l) what the characters
should do about the dilemma, (2) which character he liked better, (3)
which character he preferred to play with, and (4.) how the characters
felt about each other. In addition to these responses, the subject was
to indicate which of two paper cut-out figures represented each character.
Analyses of these response measures indicated that preschool aged
children were sensitive to imbalance in the small scale social systems
and were able to restructure them in order to bring about consistency.
The use of tape recorded stories designed to permit interaction
between the subject and the characters is an effective device for the
study of social cognition in young children. Implications for future
research to determine the relationship between power and affect were made.
